1 00:00:01,710 --> 00:00:04,239 Hi . Hey everyone . Good afternoon . 2 00:00:04,250 --> 00:00:06,760 Apologies for the delay here . Um I 3 00:00:06,769 --> 00:00:09,390 have a few items to take uh to relay at 4 00:00:09,399 --> 00:00:11,510 the top and then I'm happy to jump in 5 00:00:11,510 --> 00:00:13,510 and take your questions . Um So the 6 00:00:13,510 --> 00:00:15,455 Department of Defense continues to 7 00:00:15,455 --> 00:00:17,677 actively address the incident involving 8 00:00:17,677 --> 00:00:19,399 the unauthorized disclosure of 9 00:00:19,399 --> 00:00:21,621 classified documents . As the secretary 10 00:00:21,621 --> 00:00:23,455 made clear in his statement last 11 00:00:23,455 --> 00:00:25,510 Thursday , dod s highest priority is 12 00:00:25,510 --> 00:00:27,399 the defense of our nation and our 13 00:00:27,399 --> 00:00:29,566 national security . And the department 14 00:00:29,566 --> 00:00:31,566 is taking this breach seriously and 15 00:00:31,566 --> 00:00:33,677 continues to work around the clock to 16 00:00:33,677 --> 00:00:35,788 better understand the scope and scale 17 00:00:35,788 --> 00:00:37,899 of these leaks throughout last week . 18 00:00:37,899 --> 00:00:39,955 And over the course of the weekend , 19 00:00:39,955 --> 00:00:41,843 the Secretary and senior Pentagon 20 00:00:41,843 --> 00:00:43,843 officials continue to convene daily 21 00:00:43,843 --> 00:00:46,066 meetings to examine the scope and scale 22 00:00:46,066 --> 00:00:48,121 of this disclosure as well as ensure 23 00:00:48,121 --> 00:00:50,177 that appropriate mitigation measures 24 00:00:50,177 --> 00:00:52,121 are being taken in support of this 25 00:00:52,121 --> 00:00:54,121 effort . The secretary has formally 26 00:00:54,121 --> 00:00:56,343 directed under Secretary of Defense for 27 00:00:56,343 --> 00:00:57,955 Intelligence and Security in 28 00:00:57,955 --> 00:01:00,177 coordination with the Chief Information 29 00:01:00,177 --> 00:01:01,732 Officer and the director of 30 00:01:01,732 --> 00:01:03,955 administration and management to lead a 31 00:01:03,955 --> 00:01:06,010 comprehensive review of dod security 32 00:01:06,010 --> 00:01:07,955 programs , policies and procedures 33 00:01:07,955 --> 00:01:10,169 within 45 days I N S will provide the 34 00:01:10,180 --> 00:01:12,180 secretary with initial findings and 35 00:01:12,180 --> 00:01:13,902 recommendations to improve the 36 00:01:13,902 --> 00:01:15,958 department's policies and procedures 37 00:01:15,958 --> 00:01:18,180 related to the protection of classified 38 00:01:18,180 --> 00:01:20,236 information . We'll have more to say 39 00:01:20,236 --> 00:01:22,236 soon on more immediate actions that 40 00:01:22,236 --> 00:01:24,402 will be taken that we will be taking . 41 00:01:24,402 --> 00:01:26,513 We continue to be in close touch with 42 00:01:26,513 --> 00:01:28,513 the White House and interagency and 43 00:01:28,513 --> 00:01:28,489 have also continued to engage with our 44 00:01:28,500 --> 00:01:32,360 partners and allies at high levels 45 00:01:32,370 --> 00:01:34,314 both within dod and throughout the 46 00:01:34,314 --> 00:01:36,537 inter agency , we will also continue to 47 00:01:36,537 --> 00:01:38,537 engage with Congress . Again , we'd 48 00:01:38,537 --> 00:01:40,703 encourage you to be mindful of how you 49 00:01:40,703 --> 00:01:42,703 are reporting and repurposing these 50 00:01:42,703 --> 00:01:44,870 images due to the classified nature of 51 00:01:44,870 --> 00:01:46,814 this information and the potential 52 00:01:46,814 --> 00:01:48,981 impact on national security as well as 53 00:01:48,981 --> 00:01:50,703 the safety and security of our 54 00:01:50,703 --> 00:01:52,814 personnel and those of our allies and 55 00:01:52,814 --> 00:01:55,037 partners . And finally , I also want to 56 00:01:55,037 --> 00:01:54,680 take a moment to address something 57 00:01:54,690 --> 00:01:56,523 we've seen in press reports that 58 00:01:56,523 --> 00:01:58,468 warrant us relaying the facts with 59 00:01:58,470 --> 00:02:00,989 regard to the US military presence in 60 00:02:01,000 --> 00:02:03,222 Ukraine . We have publicly acknowledged 61 00:02:03,222 --> 00:02:05,222 previously that there is a small US 62 00:02:05,222 --> 00:02:07,339 military footprint in Ukraine to 63 00:02:07,349 --> 00:02:09,571 provide mission critical support to the 64 00:02:09,571 --> 00:02:12,619 US embassy . To be clear , there are no 65 00:02:12,630 --> 00:02:15,660 us combat troops conducting combat 66 00:02:15,669 --> 00:02:18,339 operations in Ukraine . And while we're 67 00:02:18,350 --> 00:02:20,239 not going to go into the specific 68 00:02:20,239 --> 00:02:23,389 disposition of our forces for reasons , 69 00:02:23,529 --> 00:02:25,529 their duties include support to the 70 00:02:25,529 --> 00:02:27,585 defense attache office in support of 71 00:02:27,585 --> 00:02:29,640 our security assistance programs and 72 00:02:29,640 --> 00:02:31,789 end use monitoring as well as us 73 00:02:31,800 --> 00:02:34,699 embassy security support . This is not 74 00:02:34,710 --> 00:02:36,766 new and again , something we've been 75 00:02:36,766 --> 00:02:39,043 transparent about and publicly uh with , 76 00:02:39,043 --> 00:02:41,479 with Congress as well . Separately 77 00:02:41,490 --> 00:02:43,657 earlier today , Secretary Austin spoke 78 00:02:43,657 --> 00:02:45,601 with Ukraine's Minister of Defense 79 00:02:45,601 --> 00:02:47,546 Reznikoff . During the call , both 80 00:02:47,546 --> 00:02:49,268 leaders discussed the security 81 00:02:49,268 --> 00:02:51,434 situation in Ukraine and the secretary 82 00:02:51,434 --> 00:02:53,657 looks forward to the meeting later this 83 00:02:53,657 --> 00:02:53,449 week at the Ukraine defense contact 84 00:02:53,460 --> 00:02:56,240 group . Also later , also later this 85 00:02:56,250 --> 00:02:58,417 afternoon , Secretary Austin will host 86 00:02:58,417 --> 00:03:00,639 the United Kingdom , Secretary of State 87 00:03:00,639 --> 00:03:02,750 for Defense Ben Wallace . The leaders 88 00:03:02,750 --> 00:03:04,917 will discuss the strength of the US UK 89 00:03:04,917 --> 00:03:06,917 defense relationship and our mutual 90 00:03:06,917 --> 00:03:09,083 ongoing efforts to support Ukraine . A 91 00:03:09,083 --> 00:03:11,194 readout will be posted later today on 92 00:03:11,194 --> 00:03:13,139 defense dot gov . Shifting gears a 93 00:03:13,139 --> 00:03:16,460 little bit on August 25th , 2022 the 94 00:03:16,470 --> 00:03:18,414 defense , the secretary of Defense 95 00:03:18,414 --> 00:03:20,637 approved and released the civilian harm 96 00:03:20,637 --> 00:03:22,748 mitigation and response action plan , 97 00:03:22,748 --> 00:03:24,581 directing the department to take 98 00:03:24,581 --> 00:03:26,303 immediate actions to create an 99 00:03:26,303 --> 00:03:28,414 architecture and supporting processes 100 00:03:28,414 --> 00:03:30,637 to mitigate civilian harm by optimizing 101 00:03:30,637 --> 00:03:32,850 the efficacy of military operations . 102 00:03:33,330 --> 00:03:35,386 Today , the Department of Defense in 103 00:03:35,386 --> 00:03:37,552 consultation with the Secretary of the 104 00:03:37,552 --> 00:03:39,729 Army announced Mr Michael mcnerney as 105 00:03:39,740 --> 00:03:42,009 the director of the Civilian Protection 106 00:03:42,020 --> 00:03:44,440 Center of Excellence . Mr mcnerney 107 00:03:44,660 --> 00:03:46,327 previously served at the RAND 108 00:03:46,327 --> 00:03:48,438 Corporation as a senior international 109 00:03:48,438 --> 00:03:50,160 and defense researcher and has 110 00:03:50,160 --> 00:03:52,049 published extensively on civilian 111 00:03:52,049 --> 00:03:54,216 protection issues . He brings a wealth 112 00:03:54,216 --> 00:03:56,549 of experience and expertise to the role , 113 00:03:56,549 --> 00:03:58,604 having both served in the public and 114 00:03:58,604 --> 00:04:00,771 private sectors including more than 15 115 00:04:00,771 --> 00:04:02,938 years with the US . Government focused 116 00:04:02,938 --> 00:04:04,827 on national security strategy and 117 00:04:04,827 --> 00:04:06,350 development planning , the 118 00:04:06,360 --> 00:04:08,416 international security sector reform 119 00:04:08,416 --> 00:04:10,789 and decision making in conflict . The 120 00:04:10,800 --> 00:04:12,856 director will oversee the efforts to 121 00:04:12,856 --> 00:04:14,967 establish the institution to build on 122 00:04:14,967 --> 00:04:16,911 existing processes and improve the 123 00:04:16,911 --> 00:04:19,078 department's approach to civilian hard 124 00:04:19,078 --> 00:04:21,300 mitigation and response . The Secretary 125 00:04:21,300 --> 00:04:23,300 of Defense and the Secretary of the 126 00:04:23,300 --> 00:04:23,149 Army have full confidence in Mr 127 00:04:23,160 --> 00:04:25,382 mcnerney to oversee the stand up of the 128 00:04:25,382 --> 00:04:27,382 civilian protection of excellence . 129 00:04:27,382 --> 00:04:29,160 Sorry , the the stand up of the 130 00:04:29,160 --> 00:04:30,827 civilian protection center of 131 00:04:30,827 --> 00:04:32,940 excellence . And finally , a reminder 132 00:04:32,950 --> 00:04:34,950 that tomorrow Secretary Austin will 133 00:04:34,950 --> 00:04:36,839 travel to Sweden to meet with his 134 00:04:36,839 --> 00:04:39,061 counterpart to discuss security related 135 00:04:39,061 --> 00:04:41,228 topics including Sweden's planning for 136 00:04:41,228 --> 00:04:43,228 NATO accession from there . He will 137 00:04:43,228 --> 00:04:45,172 travel to Germany where he and the 138 00:04:45,172 --> 00:04:47,283 chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 139 00:04:47,283 --> 00:04:49,339 General Milley will host the Ukraine 140 00:04:49,339 --> 00:04:51,283 Defense Contact Group on Friday at 141 00:04:51,283 --> 00:04:53,506 Ramstein Air Base . And with that , I'd 142 00:04:53,506 --> 00:04:52,589 be happy to take your questions . I'll 143 00:04:52,630 --> 00:04:56,209 go to I um thanks for doing this . So 144 00:04:57,619 --> 00:04:59,786 at this point , does the Pentagon have 145 00:04:59,786 --> 00:05:01,563 a better sense of just how many 146 00:05:01,563 --> 00:05:03,839 documents were leaked and the larger 147 00:05:03,850 --> 00:05:05,628 scope , it seems like documents 148 00:05:05,628 --> 00:05:07,794 continue to surface in different media 149 00:05:07,794 --> 00:05:10,017 reports ? Do you have a better sense of 150 00:05:10,017 --> 00:05:12,072 how wide the damage was ? Well , two 151 00:05:12,072 --> 00:05:14,239 things . Um First , I'll say that this 152 00:05:14,239 --> 00:05:16,350 is an ongoing investigation being led 153 00:05:16,350 --> 00:05:18,572 by the Department of Justice . So uh we 154 00:05:18,572 --> 00:05:20,739 are working consulting with them on on 155 00:05:20,739 --> 00:05:22,961 on going basis , but that investigation 156 00:05:22,961 --> 00:05:25,183 will reveal more documents um that have 157 00:05:25,183 --> 00:05:27,294 been , you know , previously posted . 158 00:05:27,294 --> 00:05:29,239 Um And again , we're doing our own 159 00:05:29,239 --> 00:05:31,461 internal review assessment as I said in 160 00:05:31,461 --> 00:05:33,572 the top , um this is being led by our 161 00:05:33,572 --> 00:05:35,794 intelligence and security department um 162 00:05:35,794 --> 00:05:37,739 to get a better assessment of what 163 00:05:37,739 --> 00:05:40,209 exactly what documents were um were 164 00:05:40,220 --> 00:05:42,109 disclosed and where they serviced 165 00:05:42,109 --> 00:05:44,730 online . But do you have a kind of a 166 00:05:44,739 --> 00:05:47,089 ballpark assessment of just how many 167 00:05:47,100 --> 00:05:49,100 documents there were ? And it seems 168 00:05:49,100 --> 00:05:51,211 like some of these documents may have 169 00:05:51,211 --> 00:05:53,489 been put out months ago um and predate , 170 00:05:53,489 --> 00:05:55,211 you know , the window that the 171 00:05:55,211 --> 00:05:57,267 secretary was initially focused on . 172 00:05:57,267 --> 00:05:59,600 Well , as the secretary said , you know , 173 00:05:59,600 --> 00:06:01,489 we're gonna continue to find docs 174 00:06:01,489 --> 00:06:03,711 online . Um I think you're referring to 175 00:06:03,711 --> 00:06:05,933 his comments at the um press conference 176 00:06:05,933 --> 00:06:08,044 that he participated in last week . I 177 00:06:08,044 --> 00:06:07,630 don't have a specific number for you at 178 00:06:07,640 --> 00:06:09,807 the moment . It's something that we're 179 00:06:09,807 --> 00:06:12,140 still reviewing , we're still assessing . 180 00:06:12,140 --> 00:06:14,251 Um And when we have a better grasp of 181 00:06:14,251 --> 00:06:16,410 just the scope and scale , um we'd be 182 00:06:16,420 --> 00:06:18,253 happy to update you , but that's 183 00:06:18,253 --> 00:06:20,198 something that we're continuing to 184 00:06:20,198 --> 00:06:20,130 assess . I guess the heart of the 185 00:06:20,140 --> 00:06:22,362 question is , is the Pentagon concerned 186 00:06:22,362 --> 00:06:24,473 that there's still more documents out 187 00:06:24,473 --> 00:06:24,170 there that it doesn't know about . Well , 188 00:06:24,179 --> 00:06:26,290 we're continuing to assess and that's 189 00:06:26,290 --> 00:06:28,401 exactly what our internal efforts are 190 00:06:28,401 --> 00:06:30,401 geared towards and , and looking to 191 00:06:30,401 --> 00:06:32,235 review . And that's also why the 192 00:06:32,235 --> 00:06:34,235 Department of Justice is also , has 193 00:06:34,235 --> 00:06:36,457 launched an investigation to figure out 194 00:06:36,457 --> 00:06:38,568 what exactly is still out there . And 195 00:06:38,568 --> 00:06:40,790 um you know , also assessing the impact 196 00:06:40,790 --> 00:06:42,901 that this has not just on us security 197 00:06:42,901 --> 00:06:44,901 interests , but on our partners and 198 00:06:44,901 --> 00:06:47,123 allies around the world . I'll go ahead 199 00:06:47,123 --> 00:06:50,809 to Jen Sabrina . Why is airman not 200 00:06:50,820 --> 00:06:53,470 being tried in a military court ? And 201 00:06:53,480 --> 00:06:55,950 could he be later tried under U C M J ? 202 00:06:56,190 --> 00:06:58,809 So this is an ongoing investigation and 203 00:06:58,820 --> 00:07:01,390 um in terms of uh jurisdiction , 204 00:07:01,399 --> 00:07:03,455 something that we're working through 205 00:07:03,455 --> 00:07:05,621 with the Department of Justice . But , 206 00:07:05,621 --> 00:07:07,732 uh right now this is something that's 207 00:07:07,732 --> 00:07:09,739 in D J's hands and we'll keep you 208 00:07:09,750 --> 00:07:11,583 updated as that goes . So you're 209 00:07:11,583 --> 00:07:13,750 suggesting that there could still be a 210 00:07:13,750 --> 00:07:16,290 U C M J trial after the federal trial . 211 00:07:16,299 --> 00:07:18,299 It's something that we're , we're , 212 00:07:18,299 --> 00:07:19,799 again , this is an ongoing 213 00:07:19,799 --> 00:07:21,966 investigation . It's something that we 214 00:07:21,966 --> 00:07:24,188 are working through with the Department 215 00:07:24,188 --> 00:07:26,132 of Justice , but I just don't have 216 00:07:26,132 --> 00:07:28,355 anything to announce on that front just 217 00:07:28,355 --> 00:07:28,295 yet . But it's confusing because 218 00:07:28,304 --> 00:07:30,637 someone like , uh , Chelsea Manning was , 219 00:07:30,885 --> 00:07:33,052 was held at Quantico and then tried up 220 00:07:33,052 --> 00:07:34,996 at Fort Meade , not in the federal 221 00:07:34,996 --> 00:07:36,663 system . How does it work ? I 222 00:07:36,663 --> 00:07:38,829 understand it's ongoing . But how does 223 00:07:38,829 --> 00:07:41,107 this work again ? We're assessing this ? 224 00:07:41,107 --> 00:07:43,329 We're still working with the Department 225 00:07:43,329 --> 00:07:42,970 of Justice on this issue right now . 226 00:07:42,980 --> 00:07:45,179 They are the lead investigators for , 227 00:07:45,190 --> 00:07:47,301 um , this case , this criminal case . 228 00:07:47,301 --> 00:07:49,301 Um , it's not to say that something 229 00:07:49,301 --> 00:07:51,634 couldn't come back to the department of , 230 00:07:51,634 --> 00:07:53,746 uh , defense at , at some point . But 231 00:07:53,746 --> 00:07:55,357 right now , um , in terms of 232 00:07:55,357 --> 00:07:57,579 jurisdiction , we're just , we're still 233 00:07:57,579 --> 00:07:59,690 working through that and I just don't 234 00:07:59,690 --> 00:07:59,119 have anything to announce today and 235 00:07:59,130 --> 00:08:01,130 just to , to follow up what can you 236 00:08:01,130 --> 00:08:03,690 tell us about the Navy ? N C O Sarah 237 00:08:03,700 --> 00:08:06,239 Beals , who calls herself Donbas Dika . 238 00:08:06,700 --> 00:08:09,220 Uh Why was she honorably discharged 239 00:08:09,230 --> 00:08:11,341 from the Navy and demoted to ranks in 240 00:08:11,341 --> 00:08:13,940 November in terms of the specifics on 241 00:08:13,950 --> 00:08:16,061 her record , I would refer you to the 242 00:08:16,061 --> 00:08:18,228 Navy for those questions , but she was 243 00:08:18,228 --> 00:08:21,079 posting um pro Kremlin propaganda since 244 00:08:21,089 --> 00:08:24,070 2014 and she had a T S security 245 00:08:24,079 --> 00:08:26,290 clearance , was the department aware 246 00:08:26,299 --> 00:08:28,188 that she was posting that kind of 247 00:08:28,188 --> 00:08:31,010 propaganda ? And was , you know , was 248 00:08:31,019 --> 00:08:33,186 that under investigation prior to this 249 00:08:33,186 --> 00:08:35,130 classified leaks case ? Yeah , and 250 00:08:35,130 --> 00:08:37,186 that's , thanks Jen . That's a great 251 00:08:37,186 --> 00:08:39,130 question . And something that , uh 252 00:08:39,130 --> 00:08:41,297 we're certainly looking , looking into 253 00:08:41,297 --> 00:08:43,519 because this investigation is ongoing . 254 00:08:43,519 --> 00:08:45,797 Um , I'd refer you to the DOJ for that . 255 00:08:45,797 --> 00:08:47,908 But is she under investigation by the 256 00:08:47,908 --> 00:08:50,130 military ? Well , she's not , she's not 257 00:08:50,130 --> 00:08:52,408 a , uh , she's a former service member . 258 00:08:52,408 --> 00:08:54,630 You can bring her back on to duty right 259 00:08:54,630 --> 00:08:56,630 now . I have nothing to announce at 260 00:08:56,630 --> 00:08:56,090 this point . I would refer you to the 261 00:08:56,099 --> 00:08:58,099 Department of Justice . Thank you , 262 00:08:58,099 --> 00:09:01,219 Travis . Um Thank you . I'm just 263 00:09:01,229 --> 00:09:02,840 wondering , um , you say the 264 00:09:02,840 --> 00:09:04,562 investigation is ongoing . I'm 265 00:09:04,562 --> 00:09:06,729 wondering if there is an investigation 266 00:09:06,729 --> 00:09:09,179 of Tara's supervisors or the other 267 00:09:09,190 --> 00:09:12,619 people who oversaw him at the facility 268 00:09:12,630 --> 00:09:14,880 where he worked to see if uh , somebody 269 00:09:14,890 --> 00:09:18,659 else may been involved in some way in 270 00:09:18,669 --> 00:09:20,780 this . And if so , is that something 271 00:09:20,789 --> 00:09:23,020 the dod is doing or something the DOJ 272 00:09:23,030 --> 00:09:25,359 is doing ? And can you say at all how 273 00:09:25,369 --> 00:09:27,591 that might work . So a few questions in 274 00:09:27,591 --> 00:09:29,813 there , um , on the , on the first part 275 00:09:29,813 --> 00:09:31,758 of uh the actual unit itself , I'd 276 00:09:31,758 --> 00:09:33,758 refer you to the Air Force for that 277 00:09:33,758 --> 00:09:35,258 again . This is an ongoing 278 00:09:35,258 --> 00:09:37,480 investigation and I don't mean to sound 279 00:09:37,480 --> 00:09:39,591 like a broken record here , but it is 280 00:09:39,591 --> 00:09:41,758 an ongoing investigation and being led 281 00:09:41,758 --> 00:09:44,036 by the Department of Justice right now . 282 00:09:44,036 --> 00:09:43,849 So for any questions related to the 283 00:09:43,859 --> 00:09:45,970 investigation , I'd also refer you to 284 00:09:45,970 --> 00:09:48,026 them . So you're referring me to the 285 00:09:48,026 --> 00:09:47,919 Air Force and whether there is a 286 00:09:47,929 --> 00:09:50,096 military investigation that is ongoing 287 00:09:50,096 --> 00:09:52,151 at the facility . That's correct . I 288 00:09:52,151 --> 00:09:54,373 can't say whether there is a military , 289 00:09:54,373 --> 00:09:56,485 I'm not aware of one at this moment . 290 00:09:56,485 --> 00:09:56,190 So that's why I'd refer you to the Air 291 00:09:56,200 --> 00:09:58,367 Force . Ok . And you said that there's 292 00:09:58,367 --> 00:10:00,780 a review , ongoing new review that the 293 00:10:00,789 --> 00:10:03,030 secretary had ordered and just to be 294 00:10:03,039 --> 00:10:05,150 clear as part of that review , you'll 295 00:10:05,150 --> 00:10:07,206 be looking at who has access to this 296 00:10:07,206 --> 00:10:09,450 type of information , that is the 297 00:10:09,460 --> 00:10:11,571 direction of the review . That's part 298 00:10:11,571 --> 00:10:13,904 of the review . Yes , who has access to , 299 00:10:13,904 --> 00:10:16,849 um who is able to access and review 300 00:10:16,859 --> 00:10:18,803 classified information , sensitive 301 00:10:18,803 --> 00:10:22,330 information . Um And part of that is um 302 00:10:22,340 --> 00:10:24,173 not just looking here within the 303 00:10:24,173 --> 00:10:26,118 building but across our components 304 00:10:26,118 --> 00:10:28,118 worldwide . Um So that is something 305 00:10:28,118 --> 00:10:30,284 that our team here is looking at , but 306 00:10:30,284 --> 00:10:32,340 also this is an , this is also an in 307 00:10:32,340 --> 00:10:34,562 our agency effort . Um It's not just uh 308 00:10:34,562 --> 00:10:38,250 the Department of Defense who um has uh 309 00:10:38,260 --> 00:10:40,650 stakes in some of these . Um the 310 00:10:40,659 --> 00:10:43,330 unauthorized disclosures of docs that 311 00:10:43,340 --> 00:10:45,396 were posted online . There are other 312 00:10:45,396 --> 00:10:47,340 agencies um that were impacted our 313 00:10:47,340 --> 00:10:49,507 allies and partners as well . So it is 314 00:10:49,507 --> 00:10:51,507 an interagency effort . Thank you . 315 00:10:51,507 --> 00:10:53,140 Great , Janie . Yeah , 316 00:10:55,140 --> 00:10:57,210 thank you . I have a couple of 317 00:10:57,219 --> 00:10:58,960 questions about the classified 318 00:10:58,969 --> 00:11:02,150 information released and uh 319 00:11:02,159 --> 00:11:05,020 Secretary Austen and the South Korean 320 00:11:05,030 --> 00:11:08,679 Defense Minister Lee had a phone 321 00:11:08,690 --> 00:11:11,880 call conversation last week about the 322 00:11:11,890 --> 00:11:14,830 leak of classified document and the 323 00:11:15,090 --> 00:11:18,239 ministers agreed that the classified 324 00:11:18,250 --> 00:11:22,229 document was substantially faulty . 325 00:11:23,039 --> 00:11:25,010 What is the evidence that the 326 00:11:25,020 --> 00:11:28,849 classified document is fed or fake ? 327 00:11:29,729 --> 00:11:31,673 So I think you're asking about the 328 00:11:31,673 --> 00:11:33,840 validity of some of the documents that 329 00:11:33,840 --> 00:11:36,062 have leaked online . Um Again , I'm not 330 00:11:36,062 --> 00:11:38,229 gonna speak to specific documents that 331 00:11:38,229 --> 00:11:40,285 are circulating . But what I can say 332 00:11:40,285 --> 00:11:42,340 and again is that we're just , we're 333 00:11:42,340 --> 00:11:42,229 doing a review of the documents . 334 00:11:42,239 --> 00:11:44,461 That's something that our I N S team is 335 00:11:44,461 --> 00:11:47,909 um assessing and reviewing to see if 336 00:11:47,919 --> 00:11:50,219 any documents were further manipulated . 337 00:11:50,380 --> 00:11:52,324 Uh But I just want to get into the 338 00:11:52,324 --> 00:11:55,049 specificities . Do you think leaker has 339 00:11:55,059 --> 00:11:57,940 an intention to damage the US and South 340 00:11:57,950 --> 00:12:01,080 Korea relations by leaking wiretap 341 00:12:01,090 --> 00:12:03,330 document ? I wouldn't be able to speak 342 00:12:03,340 --> 00:12:07,309 to uh the intentions of the 343 00:12:07,320 --> 00:12:09,431 individual . I would refer you to the 344 00:12:09,431 --> 00:12:11,653 Department of Justice lastly , if it is 345 00:12:11,653 --> 00:12:15,150 true that the U 346 00:12:17,919 --> 00:12:20,049 again , this is an ongoing review . 347 00:12:20,059 --> 00:12:22,369 This is a matter that's been referred 348 00:12:22,380 --> 00:12:24,602 to the Department of Justice as it is a 349 00:12:24,602 --> 00:12:27,530 criminal criminal in nature . Um We 350 00:12:27,539 --> 00:12:29,483 have a very good relationship with 351 00:12:29,483 --> 00:12:32,109 South Korea . Um You've heard us stay 352 00:12:32,119 --> 00:12:34,397 from here from this podium , but again , 353 00:12:34,397 --> 00:12:36,452 from Secretary Austin as well . Um , 354 00:12:36,452 --> 00:12:38,729 that our commitment is rock solid and 355 00:12:38,739 --> 00:12:41,440 we , we have a positive relationship 356 00:12:41,450 --> 00:12:45,369 with South Korea just following up 357 00:12:45,380 --> 00:12:47,158 on Travis's question , slightly 358 00:12:47,158 --> 00:12:49,429 different . Um , not about the 359 00:12:49,440 --> 00:12:51,607 investigation , but does the secretary 360 00:12:51,607 --> 00:12:54,200 have faith and confidence in chain of 361 00:12:54,210 --> 00:12:57,200 command on the base ? Well , I think we 362 00:12:57,210 --> 00:13:00,000 certainly have um confidence in our 363 00:13:00,010 --> 00:13:02,630 service members and our commanders . Um , 364 00:13:02,640 --> 00:13:05,070 in terms of , you know , the actual 365 00:13:05,080 --> 00:13:07,059 unit itself , there's an ongoing 366 00:13:07,070 --> 00:13:09,014 investigation at the Department of 367 00:13:09,014 --> 00:13:11,237 Justice . We are doing our own internal 368 00:13:11,237 --> 00:13:13,348 review here . Um If there are changes 369 00:13:13,348 --> 00:13:15,570 that need to be made from that review , 370 00:13:15,570 --> 00:13:17,626 that will certainly inform um either 371 00:13:17,626 --> 00:13:19,792 changes that need to be made or , um , 372 00:13:19,792 --> 00:13:21,903 you know , who has access to what and 373 00:13:21,903 --> 00:13:23,959 when in the interim , uh because his 374 00:13:23,959 --> 00:13:26,126 faith and confidence won't be based on 375 00:13:26,126 --> 00:13:28,181 an investigation . But as of today , 376 00:13:28,181 --> 00:13:30,348 does he have , we're , we're , we're , 377 00:13:30,348 --> 00:13:32,570 we're here to pull the facts and that's 378 00:13:32,570 --> 00:13:34,681 what this review will do . And that's 379 00:13:34,681 --> 00:13:36,848 what um part of what our I N S team is 380 00:13:36,848 --> 00:13:39,070 doing here along with other departments 381 00:13:39,070 --> 00:13:40,959 here in the building is trying to 382 00:13:40,959 --> 00:13:42,959 assess um what can we do better and 383 00:13:42,959 --> 00:13:45,181 what also was , you know , happening in 384 00:13:45,181 --> 00:13:47,690 that , in that unit itself . So I just 385 00:13:47,700 --> 00:13:50,033 don't have anything more to say on that . 386 00:13:50,033 --> 00:13:52,256 And on a separate note , um there was a 387 00:13:52,256 --> 00:13:54,367 statement today from Centcom about an 388 00:13:54,367 --> 00:13:56,478 operation um against ISIS militants . 389 00:13:56,478 --> 00:13:58,478 And in the statement , um I think I 390 00:13:58,478 --> 00:14:00,589 mentioned two militants were probably 391 00:14:00,589 --> 00:14:02,533 killed . Um I'm curious how you're 392 00:14:02,533 --> 00:14:04,644 probably killed . Does that mean that 393 00:14:04,644 --> 00:14:06,867 they were , they thought they were dead 394 00:14:06,867 --> 00:14:06,809 but they're not sure , like probably is 395 00:14:06,820 --> 00:14:09,940 a very um unofficial way of saying , 396 00:14:09,950 --> 00:14:12,061 right ? They didn't say likely , they 397 00:14:12,061 --> 00:14:14,283 said I'm just confused , you know , I'd 398 00:14:14,283 --> 00:14:16,561 refer you to for additional details on , 399 00:14:16,561 --> 00:14:18,783 on that front . Um But I think in terms 400 00:14:18,783 --> 00:14:20,783 of the operation itself , it really 401 00:14:20,783 --> 00:14:22,617 does stand as a testament to our 402 00:14:22,617 --> 00:14:24,672 commitment to the enduring defeat of 403 00:14:24,672 --> 00:14:26,839 ISIS . And um I would just leave it at 404 00:14:26,839 --> 00:14:29,061 that just to be sure . So are they dead 405 00:14:29,061 --> 00:14:31,283 or no , I would have to refer you to or 406 00:14:34,419 --> 00:14:36,530 two questions . Uh First am I right ? 407 00:14:36,530 --> 00:14:38,752 In understanding that you cannot say at 408 00:14:38,752 --> 00:14:40,919 this point that the leak is definitely 409 00:14:40,919 --> 00:14:43,141 contained . I mean , it's , we're still 410 00:14:43,141 --> 00:14:45,197 reviewing it . It's still an ongoing 411 00:14:45,197 --> 00:14:47,308 effort here in this department . This 412 00:14:47,308 --> 00:14:49,586 is a criminal investigation . So again , 413 00:14:49,586 --> 00:14:49,270 the Department of Justice has the lead 414 00:14:49,280 --> 00:14:51,391 on that . So I would refer you to the 415 00:14:51,391 --> 00:14:53,391 Department of Justice and given the 416 00:14:53,391 --> 00:14:56,039 ongoing efforts to review and look at 417 00:14:56,049 --> 00:14:57,771 who has access to this kind of 418 00:14:57,771 --> 00:14:59,882 information . Can you give us a sense 419 00:14:59,882 --> 00:15:01,771 of how many people have had their 420 00:15:01,771 --> 00:15:03,938 access restricted based on the efforts 421 00:15:03,938 --> 00:15:05,605 you've taken so far to review 422 00:15:05,605 --> 00:15:07,716 distribution lists and , and printing 423 00:15:07,716 --> 00:15:10,049 abilities and , and that sort of , yeah . 424 00:15:10,049 --> 00:15:12,216 So I can't give you exact numbers on , 425 00:15:12,216 --> 00:15:14,250 on , um , on the who has had access 426 00:15:14,260 --> 00:15:16,482 revoked . But what I can say is that we 427 00:15:16,482 --> 00:15:18,260 are calling through some of our 428 00:15:18,260 --> 00:15:20,371 distribution lists and who has access 429 00:15:20,371 --> 00:15:23,330 to , um , uh , certain information . Um , 430 00:15:23,340 --> 00:15:25,396 that effort is going to be ongoing . 431 00:15:25,396 --> 00:15:27,580 It's not just going to stop tomorrow 432 00:15:27,590 --> 00:15:29,757 and it's not gonna stop after a week . 433 00:15:29,757 --> 00:15:31,868 This is gonna be a long term effort . 434 00:15:31,868 --> 00:15:34,034 Um And so while I can't give you exact 435 00:15:34,034 --> 00:15:36,146 numbers , we are taking steps when it 436 00:15:36,146 --> 00:15:38,146 comes to exactly what you said , uh 437 00:15:38,146 --> 00:15:40,201 when it comes to distribution list , 438 00:15:40,201 --> 00:15:42,312 when it comes to printing access , um 439 00:15:42,312 --> 00:15:44,559 when it comes to uh just access within 440 00:15:44,570 --> 00:15:46,859 skiffs , um we have to make sure that 441 00:15:47,020 --> 00:15:50,780 um the service members or our civilians 442 00:15:50,789 --> 00:15:52,845 have what they need to be able to do 443 00:15:52,845 --> 00:15:54,956 their job . Um But it also needs to , 444 00:15:54,956 --> 00:15:57,011 we need to make sure that it is on a 445 00:15:57,011 --> 00:15:59,049 need to know basis . Yeah , Matt , 446 00:15:59,380 --> 00:16:03,340 sorry . Um Just to follow up on that , 447 00:16:03,349 --> 00:16:05,182 I wanted to see if you could say 448 00:16:05,182 --> 00:16:07,349 anything more about those efforts when 449 00:16:07,349 --> 00:16:06,940 you say you're calling through 450 00:16:06,950 --> 00:16:09,530 distribution lists . Um And you talk 451 00:16:09,539 --> 00:16:11,989 about a need to know it is that process 452 00:16:12,000 --> 00:16:14,222 meant to determine , you know , someone 453 00:16:14,222 --> 00:16:16,278 who might have had a need to know at 454 00:16:16,278 --> 00:16:17,889 one point and been part of a 455 00:16:17,889 --> 00:16:19,889 distribution list and had access to 456 00:16:19,889 --> 00:16:21,944 things , making sure that they still 457 00:16:21,944 --> 00:16:24,000 have that need . Is that part of the 458 00:16:24,000 --> 00:16:26,222 process ? Can you explain that ? Yeah , 459 00:16:26,222 --> 00:16:25,460 it's part of , I mean , it's part of an 460 00:16:25,469 --> 00:16:27,691 ongoing review . I mean , a very simple 461 00:16:27,691 --> 00:16:29,747 example would be a distribution list 462 00:16:29,747 --> 00:16:31,780 that has 10 people on it and one of 463 00:16:31,789 --> 00:16:33,789 those people has less have left the 464 00:16:33,789 --> 00:16:35,845 organization , but they moved within 465 00:16:35,845 --> 00:16:37,789 the department and still have that 466 00:16:37,789 --> 00:16:40,011 email . So it's calling through some of 467 00:16:40,011 --> 00:16:41,900 those lists , making sure that uh 468 00:16:41,900 --> 00:16:43,900 people that um are sent information 469 00:16:43,900 --> 00:16:45,789 actually need , need to have that 470 00:16:45,789 --> 00:16:47,900 information to do their jobs . Um But 471 00:16:47,900 --> 00:16:50,122 part of what this department is focused 472 00:16:50,122 --> 00:16:52,289 on is making sure that people have the 473 00:16:52,289 --> 00:16:54,456 information that they need to do their 474 00:16:54,456 --> 00:16:56,645 job successfully and be able to defend 475 00:16:57,429 --> 00:16:59,651 our homeland and our interests abroad . 476 00:17:00,070 --> 00:17:02,390 And can you say whether some of those 477 00:17:02,400 --> 00:17:04,567 efforts are already being made ? Is it 478 00:17:04,567 --> 00:17:06,122 just you're reviewing those 479 00:17:06,122 --> 00:17:08,344 distribution lists or have some actions 480 00:17:08,344 --> 00:17:08,130 already been taken to that end ? No 481 00:17:08,140 --> 00:17:10,418 actions have already been taken . Yeah . 482 00:17:10,418 --> 00:17:12,584 Thank you . And then I'll come back to 483 00:17:12,584 --> 00:17:14,751 Chris or do Chris and then Rio , there 484 00:17:14,751 --> 00:17:17,989 we go . Thanks . Um uh to share uh 485 00:17:18,000 --> 00:17:21,380 appeared to hold some racial 486 00:17:21,390 --> 00:17:24,109 extremist views . Um And that's been an 487 00:17:24,119 --> 00:17:26,341 issue for the department that you tried 488 00:17:26,341 --> 00:17:28,452 to address in the past . So , as part 489 00:17:28,452 --> 00:17:31,300 of this effort , um looking at how 490 00:17:31,310 --> 00:17:33,900 you're , you can better investigate , 491 00:17:33,910 --> 00:17:36,979 find extremism in the ranks . So 492 00:17:37,140 --> 00:17:39,969 someone who might be predisposed to do 493 00:17:39,979 --> 00:17:42,010 something like this doesn't release 494 00:17:42,020 --> 00:17:44,959 these documents . Doesn't , no , this 495 00:17:44,969 --> 00:17:48,599 effort is solely about uh looking at 496 00:17:48,609 --> 00:17:51,150 how , um or the effort I should say 497 00:17:51,160 --> 00:17:53,420 within the building is looking at how 498 00:17:53,430 --> 00:17:56,910 um classified information is accessed 499 00:17:56,920 --> 00:17:59,087 and who has access to that information 500 00:17:59,087 --> 00:18:01,253 while also working with the Department 501 00:18:01,253 --> 00:18:03,780 of Justice in their investigation um to 502 00:18:03,790 --> 00:18:05,901 prevent something like this happening 503 00:18:05,901 --> 00:18:08,300 in the future . So did , is someone's 504 00:18:08,310 --> 00:18:10,760 possible political extremist views part 505 00:18:10,770 --> 00:18:12,881 of how they might have access to that 506 00:18:12,881 --> 00:18:15,103 or is it just ? Well , I don't know how 507 00:18:15,103 --> 00:18:17,839 someone's political views in uh would 508 00:18:17,849 --> 00:18:19,920 shape how they have access to 509 00:18:19,930 --> 00:18:22,041 classified information . No , again , 510 00:18:22,041 --> 00:18:24,041 again , this , this effort that the 511 00:18:24,041 --> 00:18:26,560 department has launched um is about 512 00:18:26,569 --> 00:18:29,479 looking at our own internal process on 513 00:18:29,489 --> 00:18:31,100 who has access to classified 514 00:18:31,100 --> 00:18:33,109 information and who needs access to 515 00:18:33,119 --> 00:18:35,286 that classified information to be able 516 00:18:35,286 --> 00:18:37,452 to do their jobs . Uh It does not have 517 00:18:37,452 --> 00:18:39,230 anything to do with um anyone's 518 00:18:39,230 --> 00:18:41,140 political dispositions . 519 00:18:43,489 --> 00:18:45,660 Welcome back . Thank you very much . 520 00:18:45,670 --> 00:18:47,849 Two questions . First on the legal 521 00:18:47,900 --> 00:18:49,969 document that how many allies and 522 00:18:49,979 --> 00:18:52,619 partners have the secretary or the 523 00:18:52,630 --> 00:18:55,420 senior dod officers reached out to uh 524 00:18:55,430 --> 00:18:58,479 on the legal document so far it's been 525 00:18:58,489 --> 00:19:01,349 ongoing since last week . The secretary 526 00:19:01,359 --> 00:19:03,303 and I should just say not just the 527 00:19:03,303 --> 00:19:05,250 secretary , the chairman , senior 528 00:19:05,260 --> 00:19:07,427 leaders within this building have been 529 00:19:07,427 --> 00:19:09,593 reaching out to their counterparts all 530 00:19:09,593 --> 00:19:11,760 across the world . I think we read out 531 00:19:11,760 --> 00:19:13,927 some of those just last week . I think 532 00:19:13,927 --> 00:19:15,927 the secretary spoke to , to that as 533 00:19:15,927 --> 00:19:17,816 well today . As I mentioned , the 534 00:19:17,816 --> 00:19:19,871 secretary speaking to Minister Razov 535 00:19:19,871 --> 00:19:21,760 from Ukraine and he'll be doing a 536 00:19:21,760 --> 00:19:24,175 bilateral meeting with uh the Minister 537 00:19:24,185 --> 00:19:26,129 of Defense from the United Kingdom 538 00:19:26,129 --> 00:19:28,352 later today . Um So this is ongoing and 539 00:19:28,352 --> 00:19:30,518 then you also have to remember that um 540 00:19:30,518 --> 00:19:32,407 the secretary leaves tomorrow for 541 00:19:32,407 --> 00:19:34,463 travel to Sweden and for the Ukraine 542 00:19:34,463 --> 00:19:36,407 defense contact group . So again , 543 00:19:36,407 --> 00:19:38,629 he'll be in person um to talk more with 544 00:19:38,629 --> 00:19:41,305 allies and partners on a different 545 00:19:41,314 --> 00:19:43,925 topic . That one year ago , the China 546 00:19:43,935 --> 00:19:46,275 and the Solomon Iran , the security 547 00:19:46,285 --> 00:19:50,055 arrangement uh has , has the 548 00:19:50,064 --> 00:19:53,520 Pentagon observed any Chinese military 549 00:19:53,530 --> 00:19:56,439 activities concerning to you around the 550 00:19:56,449 --> 00:19:58,616 Solomon Island ? And do , do you think 551 00:19:58,616 --> 00:20:00,727 that ? But are you confident that the 552 00:20:00,727 --> 00:20:03,640 US is doing enough to prevent China 553 00:20:03,650 --> 00:20:06,270 from expanding the military footprint 554 00:20:06,280 --> 00:20:08,239 in the Pacific Island region ? Um 555 00:20:08,250 --> 00:20:10,194 Thanks for the question . So I , I 556 00:20:10,194 --> 00:20:12,250 think you said the Solomon Islands , 557 00:20:12,250 --> 00:20:14,028 right ? So as you saw um the US 558 00:20:14,028 --> 00:20:15,917 recently opened an embassy in the 559 00:20:15,917 --> 00:20:18,229 Solomon Islands . And I think doing so 560 00:20:18,239 --> 00:20:21,550 just um renews the uh our relationship 561 00:20:21,560 --> 00:20:23,338 and undermines our strength and 562 00:20:23,338 --> 00:20:25,449 commitment to our bilateral relations 563 00:20:25,449 --> 00:20:27,727 with the people of the Solomon Islands . 564 00:20:27,727 --> 00:20:29,671 Um in terms of , I think you asked 565 00:20:29,671 --> 00:20:32,680 about um concerning PR C activities 566 00:20:32,689 --> 00:20:34,800 around the islands , was that right ? 567 00:20:34,800 --> 00:20:37,449 Um So what is particularly concerning 568 00:20:37,540 --> 00:20:39,596 um about the Pr CS activities in the 569 00:20:39,596 --> 00:20:42,800 Pacific is the lack of transparency and 570 00:20:42,810 --> 00:20:45,032 the lack of clarity around the terms it 571 00:20:45,032 --> 00:20:47,599 negotiates its uh with , with host 572 00:20:47,609 --> 00:20:49,720 countries and its intended purpose of 573 00:20:49,720 --> 00:20:51,640 these programs . Um So we want to 574 00:20:51,650 --> 00:20:53,706 ensure that Indo Pacific nations can 575 00:20:53,706 --> 00:20:55,817 make decisions for themselves without 576 00:20:55,817 --> 00:20:57,594 being pressured , but for their 577 00:20:57,594 --> 00:21:00,449 economic and security future . Um and 578 00:21:00,459 --> 00:21:02,739 we wanna , we are committed to helping 579 00:21:02,750 --> 00:21:04,819 them do just that I'll go to Laura . 580 00:21:06,579 --> 00:21:08,969 Thank you . Um I'm just wondering if 581 00:21:08,979 --> 00:21:11,180 this um the situation with the leaked 582 00:21:11,189 --> 00:21:13,989 documents has prompted dod to review 583 00:21:14,000 --> 00:21:16,222 its vetting processes at all . I mean , 584 00:21:16,222 --> 00:21:18,479 you have airman Tara and this former 585 00:21:18,489 --> 00:21:20,739 Navy E five , they've clearly have 586 00:21:20,750 --> 00:21:22,861 extremist , racist views that they've 587 00:21:22,861 --> 00:21:24,861 expressed on social media including 588 00:21:24,861 --> 00:21:27,630 when they were in the military . Um So 589 00:21:27,640 --> 00:21:29,725 may , should this be part of dod s 590 00:21:29,735 --> 00:21:31,846 vetting process when we're looking at 591 00:21:31,846 --> 00:21:33,902 recruiting people ? I think that's , 592 00:21:33,902 --> 00:21:36,013 that's a great question and thank you 593 00:21:36,013 --> 00:21:38,235 for the question . Um We do have a very 594 00:21:38,235 --> 00:21:40,457 robust vetting process when it comes to 595 00:21:40,457 --> 00:21:42,568 someone being able to have a security 596 00:21:42,568 --> 00:21:44,568 clearance . Um that includes an FBI 597 00:21:44,568 --> 00:21:46,946 background check . Um and that includes 598 00:21:46,956 --> 00:21:49,515 a vetting of friends , family , former 599 00:21:49,592 --> 00:21:52,602 coworkers . Um And then there is uh a 600 00:21:52,612 --> 00:21:56,212 more detailed in depth on just finances , 601 00:21:56,222 --> 00:21:58,891 um , further background checks um that 602 00:21:58,901 --> 00:22:01,241 the FBI does . But I mean , I think we 603 00:22:01,251 --> 00:22:04,141 are pretty confident in how the FBI 604 00:22:04,151 --> 00:22:06,373 does conduct its background checks um , 605 00:22:06,373 --> 00:22:08,595 when it comes to somebody being able to 606 00:22:08,595 --> 00:22:10,651 obtain a security clearance . And we 607 00:22:10,651 --> 00:22:14,089 also ask and , and mandate that our 608 00:22:14,099 --> 00:22:16,155 service members are civilians who do 609 00:22:16,155 --> 00:22:17,988 have security clearances . And I 610 00:22:17,988 --> 00:22:20,489 include myself in that , um uh do so 611 00:22:20,500 --> 00:22:24,459 with uh certainly something , you 612 00:22:24,469 --> 00:22:26,413 know , you have to , being able to 613 00:22:26,413 --> 00:22:28,469 follow the rules that are in place , 614 00:22:28,469 --> 00:22:29,969 which is part of that is a 615 00:22:29,969 --> 00:22:32,191 nondisclosure agreement that we sign as 616 00:22:32,191 --> 00:22:34,413 well when you get , when you have a , a 617 00:22:34,413 --> 00:22:36,413 security clearance . And so while I 618 00:22:36,413 --> 00:22:38,636 feel confident in the background checks 619 00:22:38,636 --> 00:22:40,747 that do go into place um for security 620 00:22:40,747 --> 00:22:42,636 clearances and for someone to get 621 00:22:42,636 --> 00:22:45,239 access to one . Um again , that is why 622 00:22:45,250 --> 00:22:47,472 we are doing this process . If there is 623 00:22:47,472 --> 00:22:49,694 something that we feel that needs to be 624 00:22:49,694 --> 00:22:51,917 added to the background check process , 625 00:22:51,917 --> 00:22:53,972 I think that's what this review will 626 00:22:53,972 --> 00:22:56,194 certainly lend itself to . And is there 627 00:22:56,194 --> 00:22:58,361 any way for Dod or I guess it might be 628 00:22:58,361 --> 00:23:00,361 the F FBI to track the social media 629 00:23:00,361 --> 00:23:02,583 postings of these people ? So may maybe 630 00:23:02,583 --> 00:23:04,583 they didn't express extremist views 631 00:23:04,583 --> 00:23:06,861 before they went into the military and , 632 00:23:06,861 --> 00:23:09,028 and now , maybe , I mean , it seems as 633 00:23:09,028 --> 00:23:11,083 it seems happened with this Navy E E 634 00:23:11,083 --> 00:23:13,194 five , um there was an event and then 635 00:23:13,194 --> 00:23:13,194 afterwards she sort of went off on the 636 00:23:13,204 --> 00:23:15,371 deep end maybe . Um is there a way for 637 00:23:15,371 --> 00:23:17,910 Dod to track that or it seems like it 638 00:23:17,920 --> 00:23:21,380 would be pertinent ? Um So as you know , 639 00:23:21,390 --> 00:23:25,199 we have to follow uh the , the 640 00:23:27,229 --> 00:23:29,173 I'm trying to find the best way to 641 00:23:29,173 --> 00:23:32,079 phrase it . Dod does not spy on its own 642 00:23:32,089 --> 00:23:35,040 us citizens . Um And we conduct 643 00:23:35,050 --> 00:23:37,739 ourselves in the , the in adherence 644 00:23:38,040 --> 00:23:40,969 with the law . Um , again , background 645 00:23:40,979 --> 00:23:43,090 checks certainly do go through social 646 00:23:43,090 --> 00:23:45,310 media postings . Um This is exactly 647 00:23:45,319 --> 00:23:47,550 what this effort internally here in the 648 00:23:47,560 --> 00:23:49,839 building is designed to look at . Um , 649 00:23:49,849 --> 00:23:52,071 is there something else that we need to 650 00:23:52,071 --> 00:23:54,293 do to add on to a process when it comes 651 00:23:54,293 --> 00:23:56,405 to a background check and obtaining a 652 00:23:56,405 --> 00:23:58,571 security clearance ? This is something 653 00:23:58,571 --> 00:24:00,793 that this will look at and when we have 654 00:24:00,793 --> 00:24:02,960 more , um , to follow on that , I'd be 655 00:24:02,960 --> 00:24:04,960 happy to update you on that . Yes , 656 00:24:04,960 --> 00:24:07,127 right over here . I probably have time 657 00:24:07,127 --> 00:24:09,869 for two or three more . I have two 658 00:24:09,880 --> 00:24:13,270 questions . Thank you . Um My first 659 00:24:13,280 --> 00:24:15,709 question about the leaked documents , 660 00:24:15,719 --> 00:24:17,552 Sabrina . How much do you have a 661 00:24:17,552 --> 00:24:19,630 concern that the other parties like 662 00:24:19,640 --> 00:24:22,280 Russia or China could use the 663 00:24:22,290 --> 00:24:25,790 information inside these documents to 664 00:24:25,800 --> 00:24:29,719 harm us military operations or 665 00:24:29,729 --> 00:24:32,979 even their uh the U SI mean 666 00:24:33,290 --> 00:24:35,579 allies ? Well , we're certainly 667 00:24:35,589 --> 00:24:37,700 concerned about the contents of these 668 00:24:37,700 --> 00:24:39,589 documents cir being circulated on 669 00:24:39,589 --> 00:24:41,756 social media , which is why I think at 670 00:24:41,756 --> 00:24:44,160 the top . Um you know , I I address the 671 00:24:44,170 --> 00:24:46,180 fact that it is important when 672 00:24:46,189 --> 00:24:48,356 reporting on these documents that they 673 00:24:48,356 --> 00:24:50,133 do contain sensitive classified 674 00:24:50,133 --> 00:24:53,020 information that could cause 675 00:24:53,030 --> 00:24:56,520 irreparable damage to our allies and 676 00:24:56,530 --> 00:24:58,474 partners . But we're also doing an 677 00:24:58,474 --> 00:25:00,697 assessment of that . Um So yes , we are 678 00:25:00,697 --> 00:25:02,752 concerned about these documents . We 679 00:25:02,752 --> 00:25:04,919 feel that of course , Russia and China 680 00:25:04,919 --> 00:25:07,086 could use this to their advantage . Um 681 00:25:07,086 --> 00:25:08,974 But we also feel confident in our 682 00:25:08,974 --> 00:25:11,252 outreach to partners and allies um and , 683 00:25:11,252 --> 00:25:13,197 and working with them as , as this 684 00:25:13,197 --> 00:25:14,974 continues , second question , a 685 00:25:14,974 --> 00:25:16,959 different topic regarding to the 686 00:25:16,969 --> 00:25:20,839 clashes in Sudan . Have you seen 687 00:25:20,849 --> 00:25:23,160 the latest reports about that clashes ? 688 00:25:23,170 --> 00:25:25,337 And do you have any concerns about the 689 00:25:25,337 --> 00:25:27,503 stability of the region ? And is there 690 00:25:27,503 --> 00:25:30,180 any contact between the Dod and their 691 00:25:30,189 --> 00:25:32,540 Sudani counterparts or even the 692 00:25:32,550 --> 00:25:34,930 countries in the area in that area in 693 00:25:34,939 --> 00:25:37,739 the region ? And how do you see the 694 00:25:37,750 --> 00:25:39,861 situation there ? Sure . So and I , I 695 00:25:39,861 --> 00:25:42,083 think for some of these , I would refer 696 00:25:42,083 --> 00:25:44,306 you to the Department of State . Um But 697 00:25:44,306 --> 00:25:46,139 within Sudan , the Department of 698 00:25:46,139 --> 00:25:48,306 Defense's mission is primarily focused 699 00:25:48,306 --> 00:25:50,639 on providing security to the US Embassy . 700 00:25:50,639 --> 00:25:52,949 And so while , while I can't go into 701 00:25:52,959 --> 00:25:55,670 too much detail , we have the 702 00:25:55,680 --> 00:25:57,569 Department of Defense through the 703 00:25:57,569 --> 00:25:59,569 Marine Corps Embassy Security Group 704 00:25:59,569 --> 00:26:01,236 provides ongoing security for 705 00:26:01,236 --> 00:26:03,513 diplomatic facilities worldwide . Yeah , 706 00:26:03,513 --> 00:26:05,569 I'll go to Courtney and then that'll 707 00:26:05,569 --> 00:26:07,680 have to be our last question . I just 708 00:26:07,680 --> 00:26:09,847 wanna ask uh uh just for clarification 709 00:26:09,847 --> 00:26:11,847 on one of the questions . Uh one of 710 00:26:11,847 --> 00:26:11,589 your answers to Tara's question , you 711 00:26:11,599 --> 00:26:14,310 said that the DOJ investigation will 712 00:26:14,319 --> 00:26:17,079 reveal more documents that have been 713 00:26:17,089 --> 00:26:19,930 previously posted . So are you saying 714 00:26:19,939 --> 00:26:21,828 that the you , you think that the 715 00:26:21,828 --> 00:26:23,383 invest or you know that the 716 00:26:23,383 --> 00:26:25,328 investigation , there will be more 717 00:26:25,328 --> 00:26:27,439 documents that have not been reported 718 00:26:27,439 --> 00:26:29,495 on it have not been made public that 719 00:26:29,495 --> 00:26:28,959 will be , that will come out as part of 720 00:26:28,969 --> 00:26:31,619 this investigation . I'm not exactly 721 00:26:31,630 --> 00:26:33,686 sure how I phrased that . But what I 722 00:26:33,686 --> 00:26:35,910 mean , quote , direct quote . So doj is 723 00:26:35,920 --> 00:26:38,349 the lead investigator on this topic . 724 00:26:38,359 --> 00:26:40,581 Um , there could be more documents that 725 00:26:40,581 --> 00:26:42,581 are being circulated online that is 726 00:26:42,581 --> 00:26:44,637 something that this investigation is 727 00:26:44,637 --> 00:26:44,359 looking into . That's something that 728 00:26:44,369 --> 00:26:46,091 the department is looking into 729 00:26:46,091 --> 00:26:48,147 different media outlets here in this 730 00:26:48,147 --> 00:26:50,313 room have reported on having different 731 00:26:50,313 --> 00:26:52,147 um numbers of pages , numbers of 732 00:26:52,147 --> 00:26:55,079 documents . Um at each time that , you 733 00:26:55,089 --> 00:26:57,589 know , we are , we are calling through 734 00:26:57,599 --> 00:26:59,959 the documents that we get . Um And as 735 00:26:59,969 --> 00:27:02,219 we get more , that number grows , does 736 00:27:02,229 --> 00:27:05,890 that make sense ? So , so you do . So I , 737 00:27:05,900 --> 00:27:08,122 I guess , I mean , one of the questions 738 00:27:08,122 --> 00:27:10,122 that we all have , have had here is 739 00:27:10,122 --> 00:27:12,233 there's been this drip , drip of , of 740 00:27:12,233 --> 00:27:14,233 documents like every day , multiple 741 00:27:14,233 --> 00:27:16,344 documents per day being reported on . 742 00:27:16,344 --> 00:27:18,456 So I guess we're trying to figure out 743 00:27:18,456 --> 00:27:20,733 is , is this just gonna continue ? And , 744 00:27:20,733 --> 00:27:20,630 and if you guys have any sense , I mean , 745 00:27:20,640 --> 00:27:22,807 at this point now that you've arrested 746 00:27:22,807 --> 00:27:24,696 someone or that the Department of 747 00:27:24,696 --> 00:27:26,807 Justice arrested someone , they , I'm 748 00:27:26,807 --> 00:27:29,140 sure they've gone through his computers , 749 00:27:29,140 --> 00:27:28,900 his things , they must have a better 750 00:27:28,910 --> 00:27:30,966 sense of , of what more is still out 751 00:27:30,966 --> 00:27:33,239 there that could potentially still be 752 00:27:33,250 --> 00:27:35,472 released . Well , as you said , they're 753 00:27:35,472 --> 00:27:37,583 going through his computers , they're 754 00:27:37,583 --> 00:27:39,694 going through his files that that day 755 00:27:39,694 --> 00:27:41,806 is the Department of Justice . So I'd 756 00:27:41,806 --> 00:27:43,750 refer you to them in terms of what 757 00:27:43,750 --> 00:27:43,390 they're actually pulling off of 758 00:27:43,400 --> 00:27:45,456 anything that they've taken from his 759 00:27:45,456 --> 00:27:47,780 home . Um Yes , we do continue to 760 00:27:47,790 --> 00:27:49,901 assess what other documents are being 761 00:27:49,901 --> 00:27:52,819 circulated online um as , as news 762 00:27:52,829 --> 00:27:54,996 outlets report on them . You know , we 763 00:27:54,996 --> 00:27:57,051 are also calling through what we are 764 00:27:57,051 --> 00:27:58,885 finding . Um and that is that is 765 00:27:58,885 --> 00:28:00,718 ongoing . So I think what you're 766 00:28:00,718 --> 00:28:02,773 getting at , could this , could this 767 00:28:02,773 --> 00:28:04,662 count grow ? I mean , we're still 768 00:28:04,662 --> 00:28:06,385 assessing that um we are still 769 00:28:06,385 --> 00:28:08,607 reviewing different posts that continue 770 00:28:08,607 --> 00:28:10,760 to surface online and working with um 771 00:28:10,859 --> 00:28:12,915 you know , we're working with online 772 00:28:12,915 --> 00:28:15,081 social media platforms um to get those 773 00:28:15,081 --> 00:28:17,137 documents and , and to review them , 774 00:28:17,137 --> 00:28:19,192 just one from Jennifer's questions . 775 00:28:19,192 --> 00:28:21,248 I'm still not clear on Sarah Bills I 776 00:28:21,248 --> 00:28:23,303 think is her name the the NAV former 777 00:28:23,303 --> 00:28:25,248 navy . So there is at this point , 778 00:28:25,248 --> 00:28:27,137 there's no military investigation 779 00:28:27,137 --> 00:28:29,150 looking into any of her activities 780 00:28:29,160 --> 00:28:31,382 while she was in uniform . Is that , is 781 00:28:31,382 --> 00:28:33,549 that correct as far as I'm aware while 782 00:28:33,549 --> 00:28:35,604 she was in uniform ? There was not , 783 00:28:35,604 --> 00:28:37,771 but for more specifics , I would refer 784 00:28:37,771 --> 00:28:40,049 you to the Navy . But for that , right ? 785 00:28:40,049 --> 00:28:42,049 But , but now , I mean , there's no 786 00:28:42,049 --> 00:28:44,104 because like not even anything to do 787 00:28:44,104 --> 00:28:46,104 with the the investigation into the 788 00:28:46,104 --> 00:28:48,271 unauthorized disclosure of documents . 789 00:28:48,271 --> 00:28:50,549 Anything to do with that investigation . 790 00:28:50,549 --> 00:28:50,150 I'm just not gonna speak to more 791 00:28:50,160 --> 00:28:52,410 specifics of who's being spoken to or 792 00:28:52,420 --> 00:28:54,642 who's being interviewed . I would refer 793 00:28:54,642 --> 00:28:56,809 you to the DOJ for that . Great . Ok , 794 00:28:56,809 --> 00:28:59,031 we're gonna have to wrap up . Thanks so 795 00:28:59,031 --> 00:28:58,250 much guys .